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LIST OF PARTIES
The names of all parties to the proceedings before the
district court below are contained in the caption.
Plaintiffs Tim P.

Bennett, Dale R.

Bennett, and Bennett

and Economy Sanitation, Inc., will be referred to
collectively as "Bennetts".

Defendant Grant S.

Huish will

be referred to as "Huish", and Defendant Utah Funding and
Loan, Inc., as "Utah Funding".

Huish and Utah Funding will

sometimes be referred to jointly as the "Defendants".
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is based on
the provisions of U.C.A., §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the

statute of frauds (U.C.A., §25-5-3) does not apply to an
agreement unrelated to the lease or sale of real property?
(R. 246).
Standard of review: The applicability of the
statute of frauds is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness.
2.

Spears

v.

Warr,

44 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2002).

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

concluding that even if the statute of frauds did apply to
an agreement unrelated to the lease or sale of real
property, the statute was satisfied by the written closing
statement signed by Bennetts?

(R. 246).

Standard of review: The trial court's application
of a statute to the facts of a particular case is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.
Wasatch
App.

Property

Arls

Management,

Vision
Inc.,

2005).
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Institute,

Inc.

v.

121 P.3d 24, 28 (Utah

3.

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

holding that, even if the statute of frauds applied and was
not satisfied by the signed writing, Defendants waived the
statute of frauds defense by failing to assert it until 2
days prior to trial?

(R. 246).

Standard of review: A finding of waiver of a legal
right is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
L.L.C.

v.

C.A.T.,

L.L.C.,

Aspenwood,

73 P.3d 947, 954 (Utah App.

2003) .
4.

In finding that the closing statement was not an

integrated agreement, did the trial court commit clear
error?

(R. 134).
Standard of review: Issues relating to whether the

parties to a writing adopted it as a complete integration of
their agreement are factual in nature and are reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard.

Spears,

supra.,

44 P. 3d at

750.
5.

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

determining that the closing statement was ambiguous?
134) .
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(R.

Standard of review: Whether ambiguity exists in a
contract is a question of law, WebBank v.
Annuity

Service

Corp.,

American

General

54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002);

however, in reaching that conclusion, the trial court is
required to decide whether the parties' opposing
interpretations are each reasonably supported by the
language of the contract, Ward v.
Association,

Intermountaln

Farmers

907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); and the

application of the law to the facts of the case is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.
6.

Arls,

supra,

121 P.3d at 28.

Was it correct for the trial court to consider

parol evidence regarding an ambiguous provision in a
non-integrated writing?

(R.

134) .

Standard of review: Whether to admit parol
evidence is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
Spears,
7.

supra,

44 P.3d at 750.

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

concluding that Huish had breached his fiduciary duty to
Bennetts?

(R. 135).
Standard of review:

The trial court's application

of the law to the facts of a particular case is reviewed for

-3-

abuse of discretion.
8.

Aris,

supra,

121 P. 3d at 28.

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

concluding that Huish and Utah Funding converted funds
belonging to the Bennetts?

(R.

Standard of review:

135-136).

The trial court's application

of the law to the facts of a particular case is reviewed for
abuse of discretion,
9.

Arls,

supra,

121 P.3d at 28.

Was the trial court's decision to assess punitive

damages clearly erroneous?

(R.

136-140)

Standard of review: Punitive damages are allowed
where there is conduct which manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and disregard for, the rights
of others.

Crookston

789, 807 (Utah 1991).

v.

Fire

Insurance

Exchange,

817 P.2d

Since this requires the trial court

to make a factual determination of the defendants' mental
state and intentions, the reviewing court reverses only if
it concludes that the determination was clearly erroneous.
Spears,
10.

supra,

44 P.3d at 750.

Have the Defendants presented sufficient evidence

to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial
court's punitive damages award, which was under $100,000 and

-4-

less than three times the actual damages?

(R.

136-139).

Standard of review: Whether punitive damages are
excessive is reviewed de novo,
Inc.,

Smith

v.

Fairfax

Realty,

82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003); however, where an

award of punitive damages is well below $100,000, and is
also less than three times the amount of actual damages, it
is entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Fire

Insurance
11.

Exchange,

Crookston

v.

817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991).

Did the trial court err in awarding prejudgment

interest?

(R. 138).
Standard of review: The decision to award

prejudgment interest is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness.
Brewing

Co.,

12.

Carlson

Distributing

Co.

v.

Salt

L.C. , 95 P.3d 1171, 1176 (Utah App.

Lake
2004).

Did the trial court act within its discretion in

holding that Huish waived the corporate shield defense by
failing to assert it until after trial?

(R.

162, 245).

Standard of review: A finding of waiver of a legal
right is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
I.L.C.

v.

C.A.T.,

L.L.C.,

Aspenwood,

73 P.3d 947, 954 (Utah App.

2003).
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13.

Was the trial court correct in holding that even

if Huish had not waived the corporate shield defense, he was
personally liable for his own actions in breaching his
fiduciary duty to Bennetts and converting their funds?

(R.

245) .
Standard of review: Questions of law are reviewed
for correctness.

Spears,

supra.,

44 P. 3d at 750.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
The only constitutional provision, statute, ordinance,
rule or regulation whose interpretation is determinative of
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal is the
applicable Statue of Frauds, Utah Code Ann., §25-5-3:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May, 2000, Bennetts met Huish for the first time.
(See trial court's Findings of Fact (hereinafter "FOF"), 23,
R.

127) .

It was at a loan closing.

(Id.)

Huish was a

loan broker for a lender named Robert Kent, dba UTCO.
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(Id.)

The loan to Bennetts was for $1.2 million at 18% for 90 days
(the "UTCO Loan").

(FOF 11, 3; R.

126-127).

The purpose

of the UTCO Loan was to buy industrial property on Beck
Street to operate Bennetts' sanitation business and an auto
salvage business.

(Id.)

Up until closing, Bennetts had expected the UTCO Loan
to be for 1 year.
too short.

(FOF 12-3; R.

(FOF 14; R.

127). The 90-day term was

127). Bennetts would have walked

away from the loan but for promises made to them by Huish at
closing that he had a long term replacement loan for them
which would fund in 45 days or less.

(FOF 14; R. 127).

Based on those promises, Bennetts accepted the UTCO Loan and
Huish was paid a commission of $72,000.
128; Tr.

(FOF 15; R.

127-

171).

Huish instructed Bennetts at closing that they were to
have no contact with UTCO, but were to deal only through
him, Huish.

(FOF 16; R.

129). All payments on the UTCO

Loan were made by Bennetts to Huish to be delivered to UTCO.
(FOF 16, 8, 9, 10, 14; R.

129, 131, 134).

There was no long term loan.

(FOF 18; R.

129). At

the end of the 90 days, Bennetts paid an $18,000 rollover
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fee to extend the $1.2 million loan an additional 30 days.
{Id.).

Bennetts believed all this money went to UTCO, but

without their knowledge or consent, Huish kept $6,000 of it
for himself.

(FOF fQ; R.

129-130).

Huish was able to keep

this money because he had authority from Robert Kent to set
(Id.)

the amount of the rollover fees.
this to Bennetts.

(FOF 18,

14; R.

He never disclosed

129-130, 134).

During the 30-day extension, Bennetts paid UTCO
approximately $227,000 in principal paydowns.
131).

(FOF $9; R.

They obtained this money by borrowing against other

properties owned by them.

(Id.)

At the end of the 30-day

extension, Bennetts paid an additional $93,308, to be
applied against interest and principal, and to obtain a
60-day extension.

(FOF 510, R.

131).

Bennetts believed the entire $93,308 would be paid to
UTCO, but Huish kept approximately $19,000 for himself,
without their knowledge or consent.

(FOF 510, R.

131-132).

All during the original 90-day term of the UTCO Loan,
and through the 30-day and 60-day extensions, Huish was
promising Bennetts that their long-term loan would soon
close.

(FOF, 8-10; R.

129-132).
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When the 60-day extension expired at the end of
October, 2000, Bennetts borrowed $70,000 to extend the UTCO
Loan one more time.

(FOF 512; R.

132). Huish acted as

their agent in procuring the $70,000 loan, and he prepared
the loan documents, including written disbursement
instructions (hereinafter referred to as the "closing
statement").

(FOF 512; R.

132-134).

The closing statement

(a copy of which is included in the Addendum to Appellant's
Brief as Exhibit A) included a line item for $27,955.98 to
be paid to Utah Funding for "30 day Loan extension Beck
Street."

(Id.)

Utah Funding was a company owned and

controlled by Huish.

(FOF $8; R.

129-130).

Before signing the closing statement, Bennetts asked
Huish what the $27,955.98 was for.

(Tr.

45-47).

He told

them it would be used, in part, as a 30-day rollover for the
month of November.

(FOF 514/ R.

133-134 (note: pages 133

and 134 in the Record are out of order).

He assured them

that the long-term loan he had supposedly been working on
all these months would close before Thanksgiving.
R.

(FOF 512;

132). He further told them that if, for some reason,

the closing was delayed into December, then a portion of the
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$27,955.98 would be used to extend the $1.2 million loan
through closing.

(FOF $12, 14; R.

132-134) . Any remainder

would be used as a prepayment to Huish on his commission for
obtaining the long-term loan.

(Id.)

Any portion of the

$27,955.98 not used for rollover fees to UTCO or as a
commission to Huish for the long-term loan would be returned
to Bennetts.

(Id.)

Contrary to his representations, Huish paid $9,314 from
the $27,955.98 to UTCO and kept the balance ($18,641.98) for
himself.

(FOF 514; R.

134).

Thanksgiving came and went.
long-term loan.

(FOF 515; R.

There was still no

134). Huish told Bennetts

UTCO was demanding $50,000 as a rollover fee for December.
(Id.)

Huish, not Robert Kent, set the rollover fee at

$50,000 for December.

(Id.)

Huish did not have a long-term

loan for Bennetts and he knew that Bennetts had exhausted
their borrowing ability.

(Id.)

Huish did not disclose to

the Bennetts that he had authority from Kent to set the
amount of the rollover fees.

(FOF f14-15; R.

Bennetts had no more money.

(Id.)

134).

They filed for

Chapter 11 protection on December 6 and requested return of
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the $27,955.98, but Huish refused to return the money.
515, 16; R.

134-135).

(FOF

Bennetts have since had the Beck

Street property repossessed, along with several other
properties that were mortgaged to make the paydowns to UTCO.
(FOF 115; R.

134-135).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Huish was acting as Bennetts' agent, both to deal with
UTCO and to find a long-term loan.

As their agent, Huish

owed a fiduciary duty to Bennetts.

He breached that duty by

failing to disclose his authority to set rollover fees for
UTCO, by failing to disclose that he was taking ongoing
commissions for himself from Bennetts' payments to UTCO, by
setting the $50,000 December rollover fee at an amount he
knew they could not pay, and by keeping $18,641.98 of
Bennetts' funds.

In addition, Huish and Utah Funding

converted Bennetts' funds when they refused to return the
funds after demand by Bennetts.

Pre-judgment interest on

$18,641.98 should be assessed because the amount of damages
was certain as of the date Bennetts demanded return of the
funds.
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Punitive damages were properly assessed against Huish
because he took advantage of Bennetts with knowing and
reckless indifference towards, and disregard of, their
rights.

The amount of the punitive damages was proper

because (1) Huish's conduct showed a pattern of disregard
for the rights of others, (2) his attitude at trial
reflected a lack of remorse and an intention to continue
operating in the same manner, (3) his wrongful conduct
harmed Bennetts to a much greater extent than the damages
awarded to them, and (4) the amount of punitive damages was
well under $100,000 and less than 3 times the actual
damages.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANTS CANNOT RELY
ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
TO PROTECT THEM FROM THEIR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
AND CONVERSION
A.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Apply.
The trial court concluded that the statute of frauds

does not apply in this case,

(R.

246)

This was a

conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness.
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Spears,

supra,

44 P.3d at 750.
The applicable section of the statute of frauds

provides as follows:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
U.C.A. §25-5-3 (emphasis added).
The agreement at issue in this case was not a contract
for the leasing or sale of lands or any interest in lands.
Rather, the agreement was that Huish, as agent, would apply
money belonging to Bennetts, as principals, in one of three
ways: (1) pay an extension fee or interest to UTCO; (2) pay
himself a commission in the event he obtained a long term
loan for Bennetts; or (3) return the money to Bennetts.
(FOF 514; R.

134).

The agreement between Huish and Bennetts is not within
the statute of frauds.

In Corbet

v.

Corbet,

All

P.2d 430

(Utah 1970), a former husband and wife had been partners in
a family business.

472 P.2d at 431.

In a lawsuit for

termination and accounting of the family business, the
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husband claimed the wife had promised to transfer title to
Id.,

her separately owned ranch to the two of them jointly.
at 432.

The wife argued any such promise was void by the

statute of frauds.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court held that

since the ranch had been sold prior to the accounting, the
statute of frauds did not apply, because "what the court was
really concerned with was the proceeds of the sale."
The present case is the same as Corbet.

Id.

Bennetts'

agreement to mortgage land to WaterPro may have been subject
to the statute of frauds, but Bennetts' agreement with Huish
to disburse some of the proceeds of the WaterPro loan was
not.

It was an agreement concerning money, not the sale or

lease of lands or an interest in lands.
The result in Corbet
other states.

In Pagano

is consistent with the law in
v.

Ippolltl,

716 A.2d 848 (Conn.

1998), two employees sued to enforce a verbal contract
promising them 20% of the proceeds of sale of their
employer's real estate development in exchange for their
services.

716 A.2d at 850.

Defendants argued that the

statute of frauds barred enforcement of the verbal contract,
but the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed.
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The court held

that the plaintiffs had alleged, and proven, breach of a
contract for the payment of money, not for the transfer of
real property.

Id.,

at 853.

Because the agreements were

not directly concerned with transferring real estate, the
statute of frauds did not apply.
In Wright

& Souza,

Inc.

v.

Id.

DM Properties,

510 N.W.2d

413 (Neb. App. 1993), the court held that the statute of
frauds did not apply to an agreement for the payment of a
fee to a mortgage loan broker:
An oral agreement between parties to obtain
refinancing for an existing loan which is to be
secured by real estate mortgages does not
constitute a sale of land within the statute of
frauds.
Wright

& Souza,

supra,

510 N.W.2d at 418 (emphasis added) .

The reasoning of Wright
case.

& Souza

applies to the present

An agreement to pay a fee or commission does not

become subject to the statute of frauds just because it has
some tangential relationship to a deed of trust against real
property.

As the court stated in the case of Bridewell

v.

Prltchett,

562 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App. 1978): "Neither is the

statute [of frauds] applicable because a real estate
transaction is merely incidentally involved.7'

-15-

Id. , at 958;

accord,

Cline

v.

Lee,

581 S.E.2d 558, 562 (Ga.App. 2003).

Defendants cite Fisher

v.

Fisher,

907 P. 2d 1172 (Utah

App. 1995) in support of their proposition that escrow
agreements are covered by the statute of frauds.

In

Fisher,

the escrow agreement was established to transfer land: "On
or about May 1, 1974, the Fishers conveyed approximately 600
acres (the property) to appellees, pursuant to a written
escrow agreement."

Fisher,

supra,

907 P.2d at 1174

(emphasis added).
In Fisher,

the escrow agreement was required to be in

writing, not because it was an escrow agreement, but because
it related to the conveyance of real property.
Ann., f25-5-3, quoted in Fisher,
Similarly, in Miguel

v.

supra,

Belzeski,

Utah Code

at 1176.
1995 WL 704769 (7th

Cir. 1995) (which is also relied on by Huish), the escrow
was established for the delivery of deeds to real property.
Id.,

at **1 (see copy of the Miguel

Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C ) .

opinion attached to
The Defendants argue in

the Appellant's Brief that "[t]he Miguel

court recognized

that the statute of frauds applies to escrow agreements and
not just to conveyances of land."

-16-

(Appellant's Brief at

19).

This argument is misplaced.

the Fisher

court, like

court, was dealing with an escrow relating to

conveyances of real estate.
Miguel

The Miguel

Id.,

at **1.

The court in

applied the Illinois statute of frauds precisely

because the case involved holding deeds to real property.
As the court stated:
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, Illinois law
requires that the escrow arrangements be evidenced
by a writing. The Illinois statute of frauds
provides that an action for the sale of land
cannot be maintained unless the contract or some
memorandum or note thereof is in writing, signed
by the party to be charged.
Miguel,

supra.,

at **6 (emphasis added) .

From the foregoing cases, it is clear that the decisive
factor in determining whether or not the statute of frauds
applies is whether or not the alleged oral agreement is for
the sale of lands.

If so, the statute of frauds applies; if

not, the statute does not apply.

Since the agreement in

this case was not for the sale of lands, but rather for the
use and application of funds, the statute of frauds does not
apply.
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B.

Even if the Statute of Frauds Applies, It Was Satisfied

By The Closing Statement.
The trial court found that, even if the statute of
frauds applied, which it does not, it was satisfied by the
closing statement.

(R.

246). This finding constitutes the

application of the law to the facts of the case and as such
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
supra,

121 P. 3d at 28.

Arls,

As shown below, the court did not

abuse its discretion.
The statute of frauds requires "the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, [to be] in writing subscribed by
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, ...''
U.C.A., §25-5-3 (emphasis added).
As found by the trial court, the closing statement (see
Exhibit A attached to Appellant's Brief) is a note or
memorandum of the agreement, and it was signed by the
Bennetts.

The Bennetts, not Huish, were the parties by whom

the encumbrance was to be made in connection with the
WaterPro loan.

In Commercial

Union Associates

v.

Clayton,

863 P.2d 29

(Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals enforced a long term
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lease against the lessee, even though it had never been
signed by the lessee, but only by the lessor.
33.

863 P.2d at

In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that the statute

of frauds provided by its express terms for an agreement to
be enforceable against one who had not signed it, so long as
it was signed by the party selling or leasing the property.

Id.
The same rule applies in the present case.

The closing

statement, if indeed the underlying agreement is the type of
agreement that is subject to the statute of frauds, is
enforceable against Huish without his signature.
C.

The Statute of Frauds Defense Was Not Timely Raised.
The trial court held that Defendants waived the statute

of frauds argument by failing to raise it in a timely
fashion.

(R.

246). A determination that a party has

waived a legal right is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Aspenwood,

supra,

73 P.3d at 954.

The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense.
U.R.C.P., Rule 8(c). As such, it must be raised in the
answer or it is waived.
Mattson,

ProMax Development

943 P.2d 247, 252 (Utah App.
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Coirporatlon

1997).

v.

Defendants' Answer did not assert the statute of frauds
as an affirmative defense.

(R.

15-20).

The first time it

was raised was in the proposed findings of facts and
conclusions of law (R.

101) , which were filed and served

less than 2 days prior to trial (R.

96, 104) . No motion

was made at any time to amend the pleadings.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE BECAUSE
THE CLOSING STATEMENT WAS NOT
AN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND
FURTHERMORE WAS AMBIGUOUS
A.

The Closing Statement Was Not an Integrated Agreement.
The trial court found that the closing statement was

not an integrated agreement.

(R.

134). This was a finding

of fact, reviewable under a "clearly erroneous" standard.
Spears,

supra,

44 P.3d at 750.

The trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.

A

writing qualifies as an integration only if it is shown that
the parties adopted "a particular writing or writings as the
final and complete expression of their bargain."
Marina,

Inc.

v.

Lentz,

Bullfrog

501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972)

(emphasis added).
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In determining whether a writing is integrated, the
trial court may consider parol evidence of the circumstances
under which the writing was made and the purposes for which
it was signed.

Spears,

supra,

44 P. 3d at 750.

In this case, the evidence at trial established that
the closing statement was neither a "final" nor a "complete"
expression of the agreement between Huish and Bennetts.

It

was not final, because the closing statement applied only to
the WaterPro loan.

The WaterPro loan was intended merely as

a stopgap, to give Bennetts time to close a long-term loan
that Huish promised would be done by Thanksgiving.
112; R. 102).

(FOF

It was the long-term loan, not the WaterPro

loan, that was the focus of their ongoing agency
relationship.

(FOF 18, 9, 10, 12, 14; R.

130-134).

Nor was the closing statement "complete".

It did not

purport to be an agreement between Huish and Bennetts, but
merely a closing statement for a loan from WaterPro to
Bennetts.

It did not contain an integration clause, or a

mutual release, or any statement indicating that it
represented a final agreement of the parties.

It did not

even have a signature line for Huish or Utah Funding.
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Aside from the foregoing deficiencies, the closing
statement was incomplete because its key provision was
merely an abbreviation: "To Utah Funding and Loan for 30 day
Loan extension Beck Street."

Huish's lengthy explanation of

the meaning of this provision highlights its incompleteness.
Huish claimed the provision meant that Bennetts had agreed
to pay an extension fee for the UTCO Loan, not the WaterPro
loan, for the month of November 2000 only, in the amount of
$27,955.98, or 3% of the outstanding balance on the UTCO
Loan, said extension fee to be divided between Huish (or
Utah Funding) and UTCO, with UTCO to receive $9,314
of the UTCO Loan balance), and Huish
receive $18,641.98
R.

133; Tr.

(or 1%

(or Utah Funding) to

(or 2% of the loan balance).

(FOF 214;

161-165).

The trial court rejected Huish's explanation of the
meaning of the closing statement.

The trial court instead

accepted Bennetts' interpretation: that the $27,955.98 was
not intended as a commission to Utah Funding or as a 3%
extension fee for November only; rather, it was an amount to
be used by Huish as necessary for payment of extension fees
to UTCO in November and/or December, and for Huish's
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commission on the closing of the promised long-term loan.
(FOF 514; R.

134).

The trial court's findings are supported by the
evidence received at trial.

The history of the parties

showed that Bennetts had delivered checks made payable to
Utah Funding but intended solely for UTCO.
129, 131; Tr.

39-42, 80-82).

(FOF 18, 10/ R.

Bennetts did not know that

Utah Funding was Huish's company, but instead believed it
was a "dba" for UTCO.

(Tr.

138-139).

They were not told

that the $27,955.98 was for November only, or that most of
it would go to Huish; rather, they were told the money would
be used by Huish to pay extension fees to UTCO for November
and December as needed until the closing of the long-term
loan.

(Tr.

43-48, 80-82).

Regardless of which version of the agreement was
accurate, it is clear that the agreement was not set forth
completely in the closing statement.

For that reason, the

closing statement was not an integrated agreement, and parol
evidence was needed, and properly taken, in order to
determine and enforce the true intent of the parties.
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B.

The Closing Statement was Ambiguous.
The trial court concluded that the closing statement

was ambiguous.

(FOF 113; R.

134).

In doing so, the trial

court properly considered extrinsic evidence of the history
and circumstances.
Association,

Ward v.

Intermovmtain

Farmers

907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) .

Based on that

evidence, as well as the writing itself, the court
determined that the parties' conflicting interpretations
were both tenable, and therefore the writing was ambiguous.
(FOF 113-14; R.

133-134).

The court acted within its proper discretion.

As

discussed above, the language at issue - "$27,955.98 to Utah
Funding for 30 day Loan extension Beck Street" - is cryptic
and incomplete.

Both parties' explanations of what that

language was supposed to mean are "reasonably supported by
the language of the contract", when viewed in the light of
"the surrounding circumstances."

Ward,

supra,

907 P.2d at

268.
Because the closing statement was not integrated and
the key provision was ambiguous, the trial court properly
considered parol evidence to determine and enforce the true
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intent of the parties.
supra,

Spears,

supra,

44 P. 3d at 750; Ward,

907 P. 2d at 268.
III.
HUISH BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY
The trial court concluded that Huish breached his

fiduciary duty to Bennetts.

(See trial court's Conclusions

of Law (hereinafter "COL"), 12; R.

135).

This conclusion

should be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard,
since the trial court was applying the law to the facts of
the case.

Arls,

supra,

121 P.3d at 28.

The trial court's conclusion is amply supported by the
following findings of fact, each of which is supported by
the evidence at trial:
1.

Huish was acting as Bennetts' agent in connection

with the WaterPro loan.
2.

132, 134; Tr.

180).

Bennetts entrusted $27,955.98 of WaterPro loan

proceeds to Huish.
3.

(FOF 512; R.

(FOF I12, 14; R.

134; Tr.

43-48).

Huish promised Bennetts that he would hold their

money and use it to pay UTCO Loan extension fees until such
time as the long-term loan closed.
4.

(Id.)

In reliance on this promise, Bennetts entrusted the
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money to Huish.
5.

(Id.)

Rather than using the money as he had promised,
(Id.)

Huish kept most of it for himself.
6.

In early December, 2000, Huish told Bennetts that

Robert Kent was demanding $50,000 as a loan extension fee
for the month of December.
7.

(FOF 515/ R.

133; Tr.

50-51).

Huish knew Bennetts had no money to pay a $50,000

fee, and no more properties to pledge as collateral for any
more loans to raise that much money.

(Id;

Exhibit 106; Tr.

20, 26, 27, 52, 57-58, 1 5 8 ) .
8.

Huish had authority from Robert Kent to decide the

amount of rollover fees.

(FOF 28, 14; R.

129, 133; Tr.

164, 185, 187) .
9.

Huish failed to disclose to Bennetts that he had

authority from Robert Kent to set the amount of rollover
fees.

(Id.;

10.

Tr.

80-82).

It was Huish, not Kent, who decided to demand a

$50,000 rollover fee in December.

(FOF 115; R.

133; Tr.

164, 185, 187) .
11.

Huish failed to disclose to Bennetts that it was

Huish, not Kent, who had decided to demand $50,000 as a
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rollover fee for December.
12.

(Tr.

50-51).

When Bennetts demanded return of their funds,

Huish refused to return their funds.

(FOF 516; Tr.

50-51).

Although Huish asserted that he had explained to
Bennetts that he and Utah Funding would get most of the
$27,955.98, and they had agreed to it (Tr.

1 8 0 ) , the trial

court rejected this testimony

133-134).

(FOF 214; R.

The

court instead found that the testimony of the Bennetts was
more credible than that of Huish.

(Id.)

Bennetts testified

that they were instructed by Huish never to attempt contact
with Robert Kent.

(Tr.

25).

They believed Utah Funding

was a "dba" of UTCO and did not understand that Huish owned
and controlled Utah Funding.

(Tr.

138-139).

They were

told that the $27,955.98 would be used for extension fees to
UTCO until the long-term loan could be closed in late
November or early December.
98-99).

(Tr.

43-48, 80-82, 84-86,

They were never told, nor did they agree, that

Huish would be getting any of that money.

(Id.)

When

Bennetts demanded return of their funds, Huish refused.
(Tr.

51-52).
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It is fundamental that an agent owes his principal a
duty of full disclosure.

The rule is stated as follows:

"The duty of an agent to make full disclosure to the
principal of all material facts relevant to the agency is
fundamental to the fiduciary relationship of principal and
agent."

3 AmJur 2d at 595, Agency §206.

Utah law fully supports this salutary rule:
Because of the specialized service the real estate
broker offers in acting as an agent for his client
there arises a fiduciary relationship between
them; [cite omitted] it is incumbent upon him to
apply his abilities and knowledge to the advantage
of the man he serves; and to make full disclosure
of all facts which his principal should know in
transacting the business, [cite omitted].

Reese

v. Harper,

added); accord,

329 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1958) (emphasis

Phillips

Petroleum

Company v. Peterson,

218

F.2d 926, 934 (10th Cir. 1954).
The trial court's conclusion that Huish breached his
fiduciary duty to Bennetts was fully supported by the law
and the evidence and should not be overturned.
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IV.
HUISH AND UTAH FUNDING
CONVERTED BENNETTS' FUNDS
The trial court concluded that Defendants converted
Bennetts' funds.

(COL 53; R.

135-136).

reviewable for abuse of discretion.

This conclusion is

Aris, supra,

121 P.3d

at 28.
The trial court's conclusion was based on the following
findings of fact:

(1) Huish agreed to hold $27,955.98 in

loan fund belonging to Bennetts, and to use those funds only
for agreed-upon purposes

(FOF 214; R.

1 3 4 ) ; (2) Huish used

$9,314 of the funds for the proper purpose, paying them to
UTCO for the November extension.

(FOF $14; R.

1 3 3 ) ; and

(3) Huish wrongfully kept the remaining $18,641.98 for
himself

(Id.),

demanded it.

and refused to return it when Bennetts
(FOF 116; R.

135).

Defendants have not challenged the foregoing findings,
but instead have argued that the evidence supporting them
was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
(Appellant's Brief at 2 6 ) .

As shown in Argument II above,

the trial court correctly rejected this argument.
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HUISH'S CONDUCT JUSTIFIED THE
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Awarding punitive damages is a two-step process:
first, the trier of fact must find "conduct which manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard
of, the rights of others."

Crookston,

supra,

817 P.2d at

807; and second, the trier of fact may then assess punitive
damages that are appropriate in amount.

Id.

The trial court in the present case concluded that
imposition of punitive damages was proper because "the
overall conduct of Huish was in reckless disregard of the
rights of others."

(COL f6; R.

137). This conclusion was

supported by the same findings, and the same evidence, as
that showing breach of fiduciary duty.
pages 25-27, supra.).

(See Argument III,

In particular, Huish's own testimony

regarding his authority to set rollover fees shows that he
acted with knowing and reckless indifference towards
Bennetts' rights.
On direct examination, Huish testified as follows:
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THE WITNESS: Mr. Kent had a preference to do his
negotiation through me. I had a very tight
relationship with Mr. Kent. He allowed me to
negotiate for him and that' s what I did.
Tr.

164 (emphasis added).
Under cross examination, Huish testified as follows:
Q
You had a very tight relationship with Mr.
Kent.

Tr.

A

I did.

Q

He allowed you to decide how much to charge?

A

On my behalf he did.

185.
Mr.

Huish also testified as follows:

A
I was pretty - I was pretty workable with Mr.
Kent each time and we agreed what he was taking.
That's what he needed to do. I didn't determine
if one percent was fine for him, he did.
Q
Well, you said he allowed you latitude and
you're the one who [decided] three percent for
this one loan?
A
Tr.

Yes, he did.

He did.

187.
The foregoing facts support the imposition of punitive

damages.

Because Huish was Bennetts' agent, they had a

right to his loyalty, honesty and full disclosure.
Harper,

329 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1958).
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Reese v.

The evidence shows that Huish completely disregarded
Bennetts' rights, and he did so knowingly:
Q
Now talking about the WaterPro deal. You testified
that you acted as a loan broker in doing the WaterPro deal,
didn't you?
A

Yes.

Q
And you were acting on behalf of the Bennetts,
weren't you?
A

Right.

Q
And so you concede that you understand that you
owed them fiduciary duties; isn't that right?

(Tr.

A

Sure.

Q

Including full disclosure?

A

Sure, absolutely.
179-180).

Knowing he owed fiduciary duties to Bennetts, and
understanding that they had the right to full disclosure,
Huish misled them, took their money, withheld important
information from them, and then, when he knew that their
money was gone and they could no longer provide loan
commissions to him, he imposed a $50,000 fee which he knew
they could not pay.

He did all this without any remorse,

and continued even at trial to assert that he had acted
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properly.

As the trial court observed:

It appears as if Huish intends to continue to
believe he acted properly. His attitude and
demeanor at trial was clear to the court - he had
done nothing improper, and charging fees without
disclosing such was perfectly legitimate and was
the wa[y] business was done.
(COL 16; R.

137-138).

Since there was substantial evidence to support the
court's decision to impose punitive damages, that decision
should not be overturned on appeal.
VI.
THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS APPROPRIATE

The second step in the two-step process for assessing
punitive damages is to determine an appropriate amount.

In

the present case, the trial court awarded $50,000 as
punitive damages.

(COL $8; R.

138). This amount was

imposed only after careful consideration by the trial court
of the factors identified by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Crookston

case: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant;

(2) the nature of the misconduct; (3) the facts and
circumstances surrounding the misconduct; (4) the effect of
the misconduct on the lives of others; (5) the likelihood of
-33-

any recurrence of the conduct; (6) the relationship of the
parties; and (7) the amount of actual, general and
compensatory, damages.
Crookston,

supra.,,

(COL 56; R.

137; compare

with

817 P. 2d at 808) .

The trial court's findings in support of each

Crookston

factor, and support for that finding, are set forth below:
1.

Relative wealth: The trial court found that "while

there was no testimony as to the relative wealth of Huish,
he obtained fees from plaintiffs in an amount over $100,000
for conduc[t]ing business with UTCO with whom he had an
insider relationship."

(COL fB;

R.

138).

The evidence at

trial supported this finding.
In his own testimony at trial, Huish admitted that over
a period of six months, he and his companies received
income, from Bennetts alone, totaling in excess of $120,000:
$72,000 from the bridge loan in May
the August rollover fee (Tr.
September re-finance

(Tr.

(Tr.

1 7 1 ) , $6,000 from

175), $19,000 from the

178), $4,900 as a broker's fee

for obtaining the WaterPro loan (Tr.

1 6 2 ) , and more than

$18,000 as the claimed commission that was the subject of
the litigation

(Tr.

163-165).
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This evidence justified punitive damages of $50,000.
In half a year, Huish earned income from Bennetts alone
which was more than double the amount of the punitive
damages imposed on him.
Huish's income was not limited to what he received from
Bennetts:
I did these types of loans all the time. If it
wouldn't have been the Bennetts, it would have
been someone else. I've done it for a long time
with Mr. Kent.
(Tr.

171) (emphasis added).
The foregoing evidence of income was sufficient to

support punitive damages of $50,000, particularly in light
of applicable case law.

In Hall

v. Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998), the jury assessed punitive damages
against Wal-Mart without evidence of its wealth or income.
959 P.2d at 110.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

affirmed, holding as follows:
While evidence of the defendant's wealth is a
relevant factor in the award of punitive damages,
it is not a necessary factor. The plaintiff is
not required to introduce evidence of a
defendant's relative wealth, but would be wise to
do so, as under Crookston
I, an award which is
presumptively excessive and might otherwise be
struck down, can be justified by the defendant's
relative wealth. On the other hand, the defendant
-35-

who appears to have wealth but in fact does not,
should not expect the plaintiff to point this out
to the jury for him. He himself must present to
the jury evidence of his inability to pay a large
award of punitive damages.
Hall,

supra,

959 P.2d at 113 (emphasis added).

Since Defendants failed to present evidence at trial of
their own impecuniosity, and since there was sufficient
evidence to justify the amount awarded, it should not be
overturned on appeal.
2.

Nature of the misconduct.

See Argument III above.

3.

Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct.

The court found that Bennetts were not well educated and not
sophisticated in business matters. (FOF II; R.
15-16, 6 7 ) .
benefit.

126; Tr.

Huish took advantage of them for his own

(FOF 114; R. 1 3 3 ) .

In reliance on Huish's

promises of a long-term loan (which never materialized)
Bennetts agreed to the UTCO Loan, which led to all the
subsequent problems.

(FOF 54-5; R.

128).

Because the UTCO

Loan was only a 90-day loan, it had to be extended twice
prior to the WaterPro loan, and on both occasions Huish took
commissions from Bennetts without disclosing it to them.
(FOF 58, 10; R.

130-132).

Repeated misconduct justifies

-36-

higher punitive damages.
Automobile
4.

Insurance

Campbell

Company,,

v.

State

Farm

Mutual

98 P. 3d 409, 416 (Utah 2004) .

Effect of the misconduct on the lives of others:

The trial court found that Huish's conduct harmed Bennetts
in a far greater amount than the $50,000 punitive damage
award reveals.

(COL f8; R.

138). The evidence showed

that, having entered into the UTCO Loan on the strength of
Huish's promises of a long-term loan, Bennetts ended up
being financially ruined by it.

They lost the Beck Street

property that was purchased with the UTCO Loan.

(Tr. 55).

They lost all of the $500,000 in equity they'd had in their
other properties.

(Tr.

57-59).

through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Their company had to go
(Tr.

52).

Huish's

misconduct negatively affected their health, family
relationships and business development.
5.

(Tr.

53-54).

Likelihood of recurrence: The trial court found

that "Huish'[s] attitude was one of defiance and thus is
likely to recur in an ongoing basis".

(COL 18; R.

138).

The trial court's observations of witness character and
demeanor are entitled to deference, and conclusions based on
those observations should not be easily overturned.
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State

v.

Pena,
6.

869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994).
Relationship of the parties: As discussed above,

Huish was Bennetts' agent, with fiduciary duties of loyalty,
honesty and full disclosure.
7.

The amount of actual damages: In the present case,

actual damages were $18,643.98.
142).

(Order and Judgment; R.

Punitive damages were $50,000.

(Id.)

Since

punitives were well under $100,000, and were less than 3
times actual damages, they were presumptively appropriate.
Crookston,

supra,

817 P.2d at 810-811.

Reading Crookston

and Hall

together, the law in Utah is

as follows: where the punitive damages award is well under
$100,000, and is less than 3 times the amount of actual
damages, it is presumed appropriate and no evidence of
relative wealth or income is required to sustain it.

If the

defendant believes his lack of wealth or income might
influence the trier of fact to consider a smaller amount of
punitives, then the burden is on the defendant, not the
plaintiff, to come forward with that evidence.
Defendants have asserted the "reprehensibility" is a
factor to be considered in addition to the Crookston
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factors

discussed above.

(Appellant's Brief at 28).

"Reprehensibility" is not part of the state law
analysis of punitive damages; rather, it is a factor in
federal constitutionality analysis.

Campbell,

supra,

98

P.3d at 413-414.
Although Appellant's Brief raised "reprehensibility" in
a cursory manner, it did not discuss the factors identified
by the United States Supreme Court as bearing on the issue.
(Appellant's Brief at 27-29).

For that reason, the issue

should not be considered on appeal.
Realty,

Inc.,

Smith

v.

Fairfax

82 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Utah 2003).

If the issue of "reprehensibility" is considered on
appeal, the following factors should be discussed: (1)
whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
(2) whether the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to
or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
(3) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
(4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and

(5) the harm was the result of intentional

malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
supra,

98 P.3d at 414.
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Campbell,

Analysis of each of the foregoing factors shows that
they support an award of $50,000:
1.

Nature of the harm caused: as in Campbell,

the loss

in the present case was primarily economic, but the harm
extended beyond that, to negatively affect the lives of
everyone in the Bennetts' families.
supra;

see
2.

also

supra,

no.

4, page 37,

98 P.3d at 414-415).

Indifference or reckless disregard: see Argument V,

pages 30-33,
3.

Campbell,

(See

supra.

Financial vulnerability: By the time of the

WaterPro loan, Bennetts had sacrificed all of the equity in
all of their properties to keep the UTCO Loan alive in hopes
of closing the long-term loan Huish had been promising them
since May.

(FOF 115; 133; Trial exhibit 106; Tr.

27, 52, 57-58, 158).

20, 26,

Huish shut them down with a $50,000

demand when he knew they had no more money and no more
property.

(Id.).

4.

Repeated conduct: See no.

3, pages 36-37,

5.

Intentional or mere accident: See

supra.

Argument III,

pages 25-27, supra.
As shown above, the degree of reprehensibility in the
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present case supports the level of punitive damages.

Where

punitives are well under $100,000, and are less than 3 times
actual damages, it is not necessary to show an unusual level
of reprehensibility.

Crookston,

supra,

817 P.2d at 810-811.

VII.
BENNETTS ARE ENTITLED TO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
The trial court awarded prejudgment interest. (Order
and Judgment; R.

142). Whether to award prejudgment

interest is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
Carlson,

supra,

95 P.3d at 1176.

As shown below, the trial

court was correct in awarding prejudgment interest.
The rule for determining a party's right to prejudgment
interest is as follows:
Where the damage is complete and the amount of
loss fixed as of a particular time, and that loss
can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time and not from the
date of judgment.
Klinger
v. Klghtly,
889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App. 1995)
(emphasis added), quoting from Prlce-Orem
Inv. Co. v.
Rollins,
Brown & Gunnell,
Inc.,
784 P.2d 475, 482 (Utah App.
1989) .

Defendants argue that prejudgment interest was improper
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in this case because the amount sought differed from the
amount awarded.

(Appellant's Brief at 29-30).

Defendants

misapprehend the basis for awarding prejudgment interest.
The important distinction is not the contrast between the
amount initially claimed and the amount finally awarded, but
rather the nature of the loss.
In "personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful
act, libel, slander, false imprisonment ... and all cases
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within
the province of the jury to assess at the time of trial, no
Inc.,

82

P.3d 1064, 1069 (Utah 2003), quoting with approval from

Fell

interest is permissible."

v.

Union Pacific

Railway

Smith

Co.,

v. Fairfax

Realty,

88 P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907)

(emphasis added).
In contrast, losses which are complete, and fixed, as
of a particular time, and which can be "measured by facts
and figures", are entitled to prejudgment interest.
Klinger,

supra,

889 P.2d at 1381.

The distinction is essentially the same as that between
"hard" and "soft" losses in punitive damages analysis.
"Hard" losses are described as "concrete" or "economic"
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losses, Crookston,

supra,

817 P.2d at 795, 805, 811-812;

whereas "soft" losses are for such things as "emotional and
mental distress and loss of financial reputation, ... [and]
pain and suffering."
Lefavl

v.

Bertoch,

Id.,

at 805-806.

994 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 2000),

provides a good example of "hard" or "economic" loss.
Lefavl,

In

the plaintiff was an investor who sued for his

proportional share of profits.

994 P.2d at 820.

At trial,

the parties presented conflicting evidence as to what those
profits were.

Id.

During trial, the parties entered into a

stipulation fixing the amounts each had invested and the
proceeds received from sale of the project.

Id.

Based on

that stipulation, the trial court calculated the damages and
awarded prejudgment interest.

Id.,

at 821.

On appeal, the

defendants urged prejudgment interest should not have been
awarded because the amount of damages was not calculable
prior to trial.

Id.,

at 822.

The Court of Appeals in Lefavl
court, observing that:
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affirmed the trial

Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a
party for the depreciating value of the amount
owed over time, and, as a corollary, to deter
parties from intentionally withholding an amount
that is liquidated and owing.
[cite omitted]
Lefavi,

supra,

994 P.2d at 822 (emphasis added).

This case, like Lefavi,

features a defendant guilty of

"intentionally withholding an amount that [was] liquidated
and owing."

994 P.2d at 822.

Bennetts' losses were fixed

as of the date in early December when Huish refused to
return the Bennetts' money.

The amount of the loss is

exactly quantifiable: $27,955.98
Huish) less $9,314.00
$18,643.98.

(the amount held out by

(the amount Huish paid to UTCO) =

The fact that Bennetts sought the full amount

-$27,955.98-in their Complaint, is irrelevant.

By the time

of trial, Bennetts had learned that Huish had disbursed at
least some of the money appropriately, and therefore reduced
their claim to the actual loss.

(Tr.

84).

The Court in

this case properly awarded prejudgment interest to
compensate Bennetts for the depreciating value of the fixed
amount of their loss: $18,643.98.
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VIII.
HUISH IS PERSONALLY LIABLE TO BENNETTS
A.

The Corporate Shield Does Not Protect An Individual From

His Own Tortious Conduct.
In a post-trial motion to alter or amend, Defendants
argued for the first time that Grant Huish could not be held
personally liable, because he was acting on behalf of a
corporation and was therefore entitled to the corporate
shield.

(R. 162-163).

The trial court disagreed, holding

that an individual is liable for his own torts.

(R. 245).

This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, and as
shown below, the trial court's ruling was correct.
In support of this argument, Defendants have cited the
case of Hernandez

v.

Baker,

(Appellant's Brief at 30).

104 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 2004).
In Hernandez,

was taken against an individual.

default judgment

104 P.3d at 666.

The

individual filed a motion for relief from the judgment,
alleging excusable neglect and various defenses.

Id.

The

trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment, but
on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
at 669.
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Id.,

The Court of Appeals in Hernandez

held that the

individual defendant had stated a meritorious corporate
shield defense, based on the defendant's affidavit where he
"specifically denied that [he] in his individual capacity
had any dealings whatsoever with Hernandez."
In contrast to Hernandez,
else but Huish was involved.

Id.,

at 667.

in the present case no one
If, indeed, in Hernandezf

the

individual never had any dealings with the plaintiff, then
it would be appropriate that he not be held personally
liable.

This is because the officers and directors of a

corporation are not personally liable for torts committed by
other corporate employees or agents, so long as they
themselves were not aware of the tortious activity.
Defendants, however, interpret Hernandez

as holding

that an individual who commits a tort while acting within
the scope of his employment by a corporation is protected by
the corporate shield.

(Appellant's Brief at 30).

Such a

rule would contradict established Utah precedent.
In Armed Forces

Insurance

Exchange

v.

Harrison,

70 P.3d

35 (Utah 2003), a corporation and its president were sued
for fraud and other claims.

70 P.3d at 38.
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The individual

defendant asserted the corporate shield as a defense.
at 38-39.

Id.,

After a bench trial, judgments were entered

against the individual and the company, jointly and
severally, on the fraud claim.

Id.,

at 39.

On appeal, the

Supreme Court explained the difference between torts
committed by others and unknown to a corporate officer, and
torts committed by the officer personally:
Initially, we note than an officer or director of
a corporation is not personally liable for torts
of the corporation or of its other officers and
agents merely by virtue of holding corporate
office, but can only incur personal liability by
participating in the wrongful activity, [cite
omitted] When fraud is alleged, a director or
officer of a corporation is individually liable
for fraudulent acts or false representations of

his

own or In which he participates,

[emphasis in

original] even though his action in such respect
may be in furtherance of the corporate business,
[cite omitted]
Other states, considering the issue of corporate
officer liability, have found that an officer
cannot hide his or her own fraudulent acts behind
the corporate veil. ... In Mecham v. Benson,
590
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979), this court noted that a
defendant, by attempting to hide behind the
corporate entity, *would not exculpate himself by
proving that he was acting as agent of a
corporation; he would only additionally inculpate
his corporate principal. 7
Harrison,

supra,

70 P.3d at 41 (underlined emphasis added)•
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The rule in Harrison

is followed unanimously in Utah

and every other jurisdiction so far as Bennetts' research
can determine.

See, e.g.,

BPS,

155, 160 (S.C. App. 2005)

Inc.

v.

Worthy,

608 S.E.2d

("Nothing in the law shields [the

individual defendant] from direct liability in tort for his
own actions"); accord,

Madlgan

v.

Tang,

805 N.E.2d 243, 250

(111. App. 2004) .
B.

The Corporate Shield Defense Was Never Raised Prior to

Trial.
The corporate shield defense now being made by
Defendants was not raised in the Answer or at any time prior
to trial.

It was raised for the first time in the

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial
or to Alter or Amend Judgment.

(R.

153, 162-163).

For

this reason, the trial court held that the corporate shield
defense had been waived.

(R.

245).

A finding of waiver is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Aspenwood,

supra,

73 P.3d at 954.

In this

case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because
the defense was never raised until after trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court should be sustained in all respects.
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